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ARTICLES
Why Business Fails in Russia
ROGER

D.

BILLINGS JR.*

I. Introduction
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, John Browne, the Chairman of BP Amoco PLC,
looked back on his company's $484 million investment in Russian oil. He said, "I've always
considered America to be governed by laws, not men. The reverse may be true in Russia."'
George Soros, whose investment funds lost $1 billion in Russia, declared the loss "the
biggest mistake of my investment career."2 Soros and many other investors watched helplessly when the Russian banks crashed during August 1998. During the 1990s, investors
entered Russia with money and, with a few exceptions, departed empty-handed. Some even
lost money on the stock of GUM department store, which is located on Red Square, and
revered by Soviet and post-Soviet shoppers as the premiere store in Russia.' After the
August crash investors watched GUM stock decline to twenty-five cents per share from a
high of $5.40. 4 It was predictable behavior for the stock of a company whose profits were
clearly evaporating. The stock was once highly prized because, unlike many other Russian
companies, GUM boasted Western-style management and accounting practices, sales of
$926 per square foot (compared to $267 for Bloomingdale's in New York), and a 40 percent
return on assets.'
There are many reasons for the failure of American investments, and one of the important
reasons is the lack of an investment-friendly legal system. True, in 1994 the Duma approved
the first part of a comprehensive Civil Code that contained rules on enforceability of contracts. 6 In the early 1990s, a voucher system introduced shareholder ownership of businesses

*Roger D. Billings, Jr. is Professor of Law at Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. Since
1990 he has lectured from time to time in law schools at Kharkiv, Ukraine, and at Kursk, Tambov and Moscow,
Russia. He was on sabbatical in 1999 at the Russian Peoples Friendship University, Moscow.
1. Jeanne Whalen & Bhushan Bahree, How Siberian Oil Turned into a Minefield. BP Amoco Learns Bruising
Lesson on Investing in Russia, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2000, at A2 1.
2. George Soros, Breaking the Bank, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1999, at C1; see also GEORGE SoRos,THE CRISIS
OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: OPEN SOCIETY ENDANGERED 152-74 (1998).
3. GUM is an acronym for Gosudarstviye UniversalniyeMagazin, or City General Store.

4. Nicholas D. Kristof & Sherly WuDunn, Of World Markets, None an Island, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999,
at Al.

5. Id. at A8.
6. WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 336 (1999).
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and soon a stock market and banking system emerged. A new Constitution had even set up
specialized Arbitrazh Courts for businesses to resolve their disputes.' And only one important legal reform remained unfinished: the Communist-dominated Duma refused to adopt
laws to facilitate private ownership of land.' This did not deter investors, however, who
could effectively control land by acquiring a privatized company. But with the laws that
were enacted and all the courts that were in operation, the immaturity of the legal system
was an obstacle to business.
Operating as designed, the legal system should have been sufficient to protect investments
by foreigners but instead it offered only the appearance of protection. Contracts required
precision of drafting and conformance to statutory requirements for various types of contracts. The Civil Code recognizes contracts for purchase-sale, compensated rendering of
services, leases, carriage, and loan and credit, to name a fewY Although freedom of contract
is proclaimed in Article 1 of the Civil Code, as a practical matter, notaries must certify
many contracts before they become enforceable.' ° Strict conformance to statutory norms
is an unaccustomed practice in Anglo-American law. Litigation also revealed some uncustomed practices. Courts outside Moscow deciding lawsuits for misappropriation of a
joint venture's assets were heavily influenced in favor of Russian constituents, who had
seized assets they were supposed to own jointly with foreign partners." Even when a court
did rule in favor of a foreign partner, the court bailiff was unable to enforce the ruling.12
This article discusses how two Americans attempted to thread their way through the
Russian legal maze and preserve their investments. One American succeeded against all
odds in the warehousing and plywood businesses; the other failed. He thought he had a
binding contract to publish medical journals but was ousted from the business just as it
began to make profits. To better understand their stories, general problems of investing in
Russia will be examined first, followed by descriptions of particular legal problems they
encountered.
H. Problems When Investing in Russia
A.

NONLEGAL PROBLEMS

Perhaps the most notable nonlegal problem is that many former soviet managers continue
to run newly privatized businesses and refuse to adopt Western management methods. They
have no understanding that when equipment is idle, money is lost in wasted capital. For
them, time is not money. Furthermore, they must tell workers whose lives have always
centered around the factory precisely what to do. 13 Initiative was destroyed during the Soviet
period when factories were responsible for nearly every family need: housing, food, sports
facilities, and vacations at cabins in nearby woods or at Black Sea resorts.' 4 This, then, is
the labor pool the two American investors encountered.

7. Id. at 167.

8. See THANE

GUSTAFSON, CAPITALISM, RUSSIAN-STYLE 155

(1999).

9. BUTLER, supra note 6, at 354-56.

10. Id. at 190, 352.
11. GUSTAFSON, supra note 8, at 159-61.
12. Id. at 165-66.
13. Interview with Vincent Tarride, Deputy Chairman of the Board, Commercial Bank Evrofinance, in
Moscow (Apr. 15, 1999).
14. RoSE BRADY,KAPITALISM: RUSSIA'S
STRUGGLE TO FREEITS ECONOMY 20-21 (1999).
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Another problem is that Russia has no culture respecting ownership rights in businesses.
Joint ventures were the only way for Americans to enter the Russian market during the
Gorbachev era. 5 Later, when 100 percent ownership was permitted, Americans mistakenly
continued to form joint ventures because of their perception that they needed a Russian
partner who knew the market, controlled the use of buildings (since they were not available
for purchase), and had access to raw materials. Too late, American investors realized that it
is best to do business in Russia on a small scale to accumulate experience before committing
significant capital for an interest in a factory. Many investors learned after they bought
shares that they were shut out of shareholder meetings. Sometimes Russian partners simply
barred their American partners from the business premises. In these and other ways Russians
appropriated assets, and the saying among disappointed Americans was that "the Russians
just want to make our money their money." Some observers believe there have been no
successful Russian-American joint ventures.
The mentality of Russians toward capitalism is shaped by the former crime of spekulatia.
During the Soviet period, spekulatia was the illegal acquisition of state property (almost all
property was state property) and its resale at a higher price. Many Russians still consider it
unethical to profiteer by "buying cheap and selling dear." But now that it is possible to
ignore tradition and venture into capitalism, Russians discover that capital is not available.
During the 1990s, banks did not perform the usual function of providing capital loans for
starting or expanding a business. Before the crash of the banking system on August 17,
1998, Russian banks invested much of their depositors' money in government bonds called
GKOs (gookohs in common parlance). Because GKOs were backed by the government,
they were thought safe and GKO interest rates were higher than the rates that banks could
get from businesses on borrowed money. Consequently, little money was made available to
businesses. The annual loan rate was always high by Western standards, but after the crash
the rate quoted to private businesses was often 80 percent, and few businesses wanted loans
at such rates.' 6 On August 17, the government defaulted on GKOs and the banks in turn
defaulted on money they owed to ordinary Russian depositors. Only the old, state-owned
SperBank (now partially privatized) assured depositors their money was safe, and even
SperBank froze depositors' accounts for several months. By 2000, banks were still so unsound and so distrusted that most Muscovites kept the bulk of their savings in dollars hidden
in their apartments. This explains why, on floor after floor of the large apartment houses
in Moscow, apartment owners and lessees went together to finance steel doors to protect
their corridors against burglars."7
A final nonlegal problem for American investors in the 1990s was that land could not be
purchased. The Communists, who remained the dominant force in the Duma during the
late 1990s, blocked passage of a proposed law on the ownership of land."8 Investors had to
do business on land owned by local governments, state-owned enterprises, or recently privatized state enterprises. Some sources of land and capital available to Russians are not
available to Americans. For example, city or state officials in control of public resources
(buildings and tax revenues) would make them available to friends and relatives. In addition

15. BuTrLER,supra note 6, at 439-40.

16. Interview with Vincent Tarride, supra note 13.
17. In Moscow, families occupying apartments, called quartiere, were given the option to buy them from
the city.
18. GUsTAFSoN, supra note 8, at 155.
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to making public buildings and financing available, they would help them obtain business
permits, smooth the way for products through customs, and make permits and space for
competitors difficult to obtain. For example, the unlikely owners of a successful cosmetics
business in a northern city averaged only twenty-five years of age. Their fathers were officials in the city government, and the children were fronts for their family business.' 9
B.

LEGAL PROBLEMS

Problems with legal advice existed alongside nonlegal problems. Early in the 1990s, U.S.
firms established Moscow branches to advise clients on Russian law. Unfortunately, the laws
were not clear and Russians themselves tended to ignore them. The law was clarified when
the Civil Code became effective in January 1995, but the Code created technical obstacles
to the formation of contracts that were foreign to common law. Even with the technical
obstacles, things improved because at last a legal structure for business agreements could
not be concluded with more certainty. But Russian lawyers understood better than American lawyers that much would still have to be accomplished outside the legal structure, and
that friends in the ministries would be needed. American lawyers found it more difficult to
operate in this climate than Russian lawyers. For example, corruption (korruptia), in the
form of bribes for favors from public officials, is commonly accepted by Russians as a cost
of doing business. Americans, however, have to contend with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act 0 and are inept at playing the game of bribing bureaucrats. Among the most common
form of corruption is the complicity of officials in tax avoidance. Russian companies have
kept white and black books of account." The white books show a modest profit, most of
which goes to the government for taxes. The black books show the much larger actual profit
that is shielded from taxation. Private schools in Moscow sprang up to teach young Russians
how to keep two sets of books.22 When a company's black book is uncovered by tax authorities the owners find it cheaper to attempt to bribe a tax official than to pay the overdue
taxes and fines. And as long as cheating on taxes takes place, the mafia has cover, for it is
impossible for biznesmen to enlist the government's help in combating Krisha5 while they,
themselves, have so much to hide from the government. Furthermore, as long as biznesmen
perceive the need to bribe officials in order to do business, black books will be needed to
conceal the cash with which to make bribes. Bribes can only be made safely with cash that
is not traceable to a bank account. It is a vicious circle.
C. THE

COMMERCIAL COURTS

During the 1990s, the Russian Arbitrazh courts (the specialized courts created in the
24
Constitution for business disputes) were getting accustomed to the new legal structure.

19. Interview with Professor Evgeny Martinenko, RPFU, in Moscow (Mar. 8, 1999).
20. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1,-2, 78ff (1994).
21. GUSTAFSON, supra note 8, at 194-206.
22. Interviews with students at the Russian Peoples Friendship University in Moscow (Mar. 1999). The
interviewees asked that their names not be disclosed. The faculties of law and business at publicly-supported
universities such as Russian Peoples Friendship University offered no such courses.
23. Krisha means roof in Russian and stands for the practice of paying money to so-called mafia thugs who
promise to keep a protective roof over the business.
24. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 8, at 161-67.
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Judges trained under the Soviet system lacked understanding of investment problems and,
indeed, sometimes there were no laws to cover the cases before them. Since Russia is a civil
law country, and not a common law country, judges do not fashion remedies unless they
are supported by statute. Furthermore, some judges were prejudiced against foreigners.
These weaknesses in the judicial system caused Americans to put arbitration clauses in their
joint venture agreements and contracts. Arbitration, not to be confused with litigation in
Arbitrazh courts, is a private settlement regime financed by the parties and often is conducted under rules of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce. Arbitration did not solve the
Americans' problems, however. After an American received an award in an offshore arbitration forum, Russian courts could not be relied upon to confirm it. At the end of the
1990s, an arbitration award in Stockholm for Subway, an American investor, was finally
confirmed by a Russian court. But Subway was foiled by the rudimentary enforcement
system, because it could not get the pristovs (bailiffs) to carry out the court's judgment.
Pristovs rarely could find any significant assets in the hands of losing Russian parties and
their bank accounts seldom contained any money by the time judgment was confirmed. In
the case of Subway, the pristovs simply backed down when challenged by the wrongdoers.
Il. Jeffrey Sweetbaum: An American Entrepreneur
Jeffrey Sweetbaum is an American who found his way through the Russian legal maze
and could become a role model for American investors. He was a costume jewelry maker
in New York City in December 1989 when a motorcade for visiting Soviet Premier, Mikhail
Gorbachev, stopped all traffic.25 Impressed, he left for Moscow two weeks later in the vanguard of young Americans looking for business opportunities as Communism crumbled.
An acquaintance in New York had shown him some hammer & sickle pins manufactured
by IGRA, a Russian cooperative. He located IGRA in the yellow pages (spravichnaya) and
ordered 36,000 pins at ten cents apiece. Back in New York, he sold 18,000 at seventy-five
cents apiece, making a profit of about $8,000.
He returned to Moscow early in 1990 and rented an apartment that became his home
for the next five years. On Gorky Street (now Tver Street), he bought himself a green
rucksack from a sporting goods trading company, Mosobtsport Prepriatia, and discovered
he could also buy them in quantity for export. The associations that developed during these
rucksack dealings would become very significant later in Sweetbaum's developing career in
Russian business. He had to obtain the rucksacks by barter because international banks
recognized no exchange rate for dollars and rubles. Fortunately for Sweetbaum, Russia had
no export or import taxes at that time. His only problem (besides finding a buyer for the
rucksacks) was that no U.S. Customs codes existed for items imported from Russia. After
the problems were solved, however, he went on to export hockey sticks, custom-painted
matryoska dolls, and, finally, plywood. Along the way he learned to be very careful when
working within the Russian banking system and to avoid the concentration of financial
assets in Russia. He also learned that Russians had little knowledge of Western accounting
practices, and the information contained in the Russian, tax-oriented accounting system
was of limited use. In all his ventures, great care has been taken to maintain accurate
accounting records according to international standards.

25. Interview with Jeremy Sweetbaum, in Moscow (Apr. 8, 1999); Interview with Barry Thomas, Jeffery
Sweetbaum's Financial Director, in Highland Heights, Kentucky (Feb. 2, 1999).
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Sweetbaum's most successful business began in 1992 when he received a request for help
from people with whom he had become acquainted during his rucksack dealings. They
controlled a large Soviet trading company and warehouse complex in south Moscow. The
company, Optgalant, had excess space and wanted to attract a Western rental client. With
remarkable foresight, Sweetbaum had already persuaded Optgalant to privatize its business
in 1991 before the massive privatization program of Anatoly Chubais was underway.2 6 He
realized that private companies, but not state enterprises, could grant leases on their real
estate. Sweetbaum advertised the Optgalant space in the Moscow Guardian and Colgate
Palmolive Peet Co. responded. But instead of turning this potential renter over to Optgalant, he leased the warehouse himself, and then subleased space to Colgate and Johnson
& Johnson, Inc. He decided to become a middleman because he believed Optgalant alone
"would screw it up."27 This was the beginning of what would become a huge and very
successful warehouse and logistics service business, ITEMS. With tongue in cheek, Sweetbaum would say that it all began very inadvertently.
At about this time a Russian named Vladimir Saltykov approached Sweetbaum for a job.
Sweetbaum hired him at $200 per month and said, "go find something to do.""5 Saltykov
knew about a plywood mill in the city of Kostroma about 200 miles northeast of Moscow
with product to export but no export license. Licenses were held only by foreign trading
organizations (FTD), or Vneshekonomicheski organizatsi, held over from the Soviet system.
Working through one of these FTDs, Sweetbaum began buying and exporting the plywood
to an English buyer. When the Fanplit Mill at Kostroma was privatized in 1993, Sweetbaum
9
decided to borrow some money and invest in it.1
Shares in the factory could be bought
with vouchers available from brokers who had bought them from Russians. Although the
value of these vouchers fluctuated, Sweetbaum was able to buy 6,000 at $8 apiece from one
broker, Troika Dialog. He then traveled to Kostroma where the Kostroma Privatization
Committee was going to auction some Fanplit stock to bidders.
Taking advantage of this system of privatization auctions open to foreigners, Sweetbaum
submitted his 6,000 vouchers to the Kostromo Privatization Committee. Forty percent of
the shares of Fanplit were being auctioned. Since others submitted only 3,000 vouchers,
Sweetbaum's 6,000 vouchers would purchase 25 percent of Fanplit, or at least he thought
they would. The director of the privatization committee informed him that his vouchers
had not been properly notarized and could not be accepted. The resolution of this and
other issues required substantial time, a lot of persistence, and a willingness to achieve
detailed understanding of the privatization law that was, at the time, "a work in process."30
Eventually, Sweetbaum's vouchers were determined to be legal, and he was able to move,
with strong community support, to consolidate his position. Just owning shares in Russia
did not mean Sweetbaum could immediately assert his shareholder rights, however. He
recognized that as long as he had only a minority interest he would be at the mercy of

26. See GUSTAFSON, supra
note 8.
27. Interview with Jeremy Sweetbaum, supra
note 25; Interview with Barry Thomas, supra note 25.
28. Interview with Jeremy Sweetbaum, supra note 25.
29. In several of his ventures in Russia, Sweetbaum has benefited from the business and financial support of
Len Blavatnik. Blavatnik was born in Russia, educated in America, and naturalized as an American citizen. He
has had success in Russia by investing in coal, copper, and nickel, and gained control of OAO Tyumen Oil,
one of Russia's largest oil companies. See Whalen, supra note 1.
30. Interview with Jeremy Sweetbaum, supra note 25; see Interview with Barry Thomas, supra note 25.
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former Soviet managers who would not recognize his rights as a shareholder. Therefore, he decided to acquire full control of Fanplit and other businesses in which he invested.
Anything less than control left Americans vulnerable to the ultimate loss of their
investments.
Sweetbaum gained control of Fanplit by buying additional shares and went on to set up
PLYCO, a Delaware company that owned Fanplit, and held interests in four other logging
concerns. His success was partly the result of a $5 million investment by the U.S. Russia
Investment Fund (formerly known as the Fund for Large Enterprises in Russia), which took
a 50 percent interest in PLYCO.3 ' Sweetbaum's methods of acquisition are further illustrated by his campaign to acquire control of Lespromservice, a forestry service company
also located in Kostroma. According to an account in The Moscow Times,32 he tried to get a
seat on the Lespromservice board by voting his 23 percent stake in April 1994, but the
long-time Director, Anatoly Osipov, had collected 9,000 proxy votes from workers who
owned 51 percent of the 27,000 shares outstanding. With these and his own 15 percent,
Osipov was determined to block Sweetbaum's intrusion into management. At the meeting,
Sweetbaum, remembering his experience with Fanplit, objected that the proxy votes did
not bear notary stamps as the law required. He also pointed out that the list of candidates
for the seven Board seats contained the names of three company employees and that under
Russian law no more than one-third of the Board members can be employees. Sweetbaum
argued in fluent Russian that the entire meeting could be invalidated for these reasons, but
the Board was elected anyway. In the end, however, Sweetbaum won because some of the
employees, nervous about the competency of management, began to sell him their shares
in the days following the meeting. He stationed himself at the plant gate and warned them
that Soviet-style directors would run the business into the ground if they did not sell their
shares to him.
Perhaps even more dramatic was his hostile takeover of the trading and warehouse complex, Optgalant, from whom he had leased warehouse space for four years.33 The immediate
impetus for the takeover was that Optgalant raised the rent for ITEMS by 50 percent.
Other restrictions had also been imposed that restricted the ability of ITEMS to properly
serve its Western warehouse clients. In typical fashion, Sweetbaum put a van outside the
warehouse complex and staffed it with representatives who offered to buy shares from
employees. At the next shareholders meeting, 97 percent of the voting shares were cast for
Sergei Isotov, Sweetbaum's candidate for general director. The takeover was complete.
Sweetbaum scrupulously followed Russian law in all he did. Much credit goes to his
relationship with Vladimir Michaelovich Zaitsev, a former law professor from Russian Peoples Friendship University in Moscow, who guided Sweetbaum through the legal system
and used an innovative technique to minimize exposure to legal problems. For example,
Zaitsev advised Sweetbaum in structuring the management of the plywood business to set
up "a management company" in which the top management of the plywood operation
would be housed, along with Sweetbaum.14 Once the necessary approval from the Anti-

31. In Summer 1999, Sweetbaum and the U.S. Russia Investment Fund sold PLYCO to a Russian investment
group.
32. Steve Liesman, Loggerheads, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994.
33. See Natasha Milevsnic, U.S. TradingFirm Acquires Optgalant,Moscow TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996.
34. See Zakon Aktionarniye Obshestva of 1995, effective Jan. 1, 1996; Interview with Vladmir Zaitsev, in
Moscow (Apr. 6, 1999).
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Monopoly Committee was obtained and the management company became a legal entity,
several benefits were gained. There were economic benefits related to reduced salary and
tax burdens, but the major advantage was that the separate legal entity made it easier to
monitor and control mill management behavior." Individual general directors have broad
contractual powers under which they might make sweetheart contracts with their own private firms or exceed company limits for the purchase of raw materials. Also, general directors at the factory level were easy targets for criminal influence. Similarly, the tighter control
achieved by centralized management somewhat insulated them. Finally, the Law on Joint
Stock Companies provides that shareholders may sue the general director for losses incurred
by the company as the result of his "guilty acts or failure to act. 3 6 Sweetbaum, as the owner,
would not sue his own company, but there were other shareholders.
By the year 2000 Sweetbaum was a survivor, in the enviable position of owning one
business, ITEMS, with excellent cash flow and being able to sell another, PLYCO, for a
profit.
IV. David Uible's Experience
The investment climate in which Jeremy Sweetbaum thrived was not as favorable for
David Uible, another young American entrepreneur.37 Uible says he lost his investment
because of a naivet6 that was characteristic not only of many American entrepreneurs, but
also of the U.S. government. The U.S. Department of Commerce encouraged Uible and
other Americans to invest in Russia with little consideration of certain prerequisites for risktaking: a stable government, a well-regulated banking system, a pool of capable managers,
and laws favorable to investment.
In 1992 Uible visited Moscow on a U.S. Department of Commerce trade mission and
was encouraged to sell used ultrasound equipment in Russia. Early in 1993, he was seeking
a better way to advertise the equipment when his general manager, a Russian cardiologist
by the name of Saveli Bashinski, made him aware of certain medical journals published by
the Ministry of Health (MOH) in which he could advertise. Holdovers from the Soviet
system, the journals were published on newsprint and without color but distributed to
physicians throughout Russia. They were venerable-the journal of pediatrics dated back
to 1902-but the MOH lacked the money and expertise to upgrade them to modern standards. At first, Dr. Bashinski accepted Uible's suggestion that they might want to purchase
advertising space on back covers. Later, Uible approached the MOH with an offer to publish
the journals, go to color, and get Western European advertising. Uible realized that publishing them would not be expensive if he used personal computers and MOH officials were
enthusiastic to have him publish the journals. He asked for a ten-year license, lawyers drew
up a contract, and it was signed by one of the two MOH officials believed to have authority
to sign for the Ministry, O.E. Nifantiev, Head of the Research Department. According to
a statement of facts by Uible's lawyer, "a collaboration agreement between the State Scientific Research Center of Preventative Medicine of the Ministry of Health of Russia and

35. Interview with Vladmir Zaitsev, supra note 34.
36. BUTLER, supra note 6, at 430.
37. Interviews with David Uible (Feb. 1999, Mar. 2000, and Dec. 2000). The author thanks Mr. Uible for
making available the files on his Russian investment [hereinafter Uible Papers]. Copies are in the author's
possession.
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AOZT 'Cardiosphera' was completed on January 24, 1994. Under this agreement the Centre agreed to provide premises to Cardiosphera."35 Cardiosphera was later renamed Media
Sphera. Dr. Bashinski became general manager for Uible's new company, Media Sphera
Closed Joint Stock Company, 39 and the editorial boards of the five journals agreed to stay
on to work for Media Sphera. ° Uible owned 93 percent of Media Sphera stock through
his wholly-owned U.S. company, Rosegate Publishing, Inc. The five chief editors each
owned 1 percent, and Dr. Bashinski owned 2 percent. Although Media Sphera did not own
the journals, he felt secure with the long-term licensing agreement.

The licensing agreement did not require Rosegate to pay anything to MOH at the inception of the contract. Media Sphera started publishing immediately and invested about
$20,000 within a few months. The journals became very profitable and Uible stopped selling
the less profitable ultrasound equipment. He reinvested much of the profit in upgrading
the journals to a glossy, Western-style appearance with color; this, in turn, attracted advertising from distinguished Western companies. 4 1 By May 1996, Media Sphera employed
thirty editorial workers in rented space in Moscow, with computers as the main physical
assets. The venture had been profitable since mid-1994, in spite of the required payments
of one-third to one-half of the profits to the MOH official with whom the license had been
signed. Uible believes the official kept the money and did not treat it as payment to the
MOH. In other words, it was a bribe. Uible was approaching major Western publishing
houses such as Reed Elsevier as potential purchasers of the business. Then, as he was about
to leave his New Richmond, Ohio, home for a monthly trip to Moscow, an e-mail from
O.E. Nifantiev of the MOH announced that his license was being terminated, the employees were being dismissed, and the editors had resigned.2 What was not explained was that
the following week a new business called Media Sphera Publishing Group was registered
in Russia with the same former chief editors of Media Sphera Closed Joint Stock Company
as primary shareholders. In short, Mr. Uible experienced the business equivalent of a coup
d'etat.
The e-mail recited that the five chief editors were "discontent with stability and reliability
of Media Sphera as our partner," and that the "Charter Fund of Media Sphera is many
times less than the minimum defined by legislation of Russian Federation." 41 The e-mail
went on to declare that there was now "lack of a place for office" and that there had been
a "cancellation of the Publishing Agreements of Journals." 44 The chief editors, in turn,
wrote the MOH announcing that they "created a new juridicial body named 'Media Sphera
Publishing Group' with a charter fund of 250,000,000 rubles" and that "we ask Russian
38. Letter from Leonid Zubarev to David Uible (June 25, 1999).
39. For a general discussion of closed stock companies, see BUTLER, supra note 6, at 425-3 1.
40. The journals and their chief editors were Dr. Belenkov, Kardiologia; Dr. Bezroukov, Stomatology;
Dr.
Veltishev, Pediatricsand Perinatology;Dr. Gusev, Neurology and Psychology; and Dr. Samsonov, Dermatologyand
Venerlogy. Uible Papers, mpra note 37.
41. As an example, during the last half of 1994 the following companies were invoiced as follows: June 1,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, $2,455; August 2, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, $2,455; September 6, KRKA, $1,355; Septemher 15, Merk Sharp Dome, $2,000; October 3, Knoll, $3,155; and October 18, Aczneimittelwerk Dresden
Gmbtt, $2,300. The amounts were deposited in Rosegate's account at Bank Austria. Letter from Saveli E.
Bashinski to Rosegate (Nov. 8, 1994) (copy on file with author in Uible Papers, supra
note 37).
42. Interviews with David Uible, supra note 37.
43. E-mail from O.E. Nifantiev to David Uible (May 24, 1996) (on file with author in Uible Papers, supra
note 37).
44. Id.
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Ministry of Health to sign a new publishing agreement with this new juridical body."45 In
a separate e-mail, Dr. Bashinski, Mr. Uible's Russian manager, explained that on May 21
all employees had been thrown out of their offices "by order of Dr. Oganov," the Director
of the Institute of Preventive Medicine of the MOH where office space was leased, and all
phone lines disconnected. He added that on May 22 and 23, most employees retired and
Bashinski "personally decided to go out of business." 4 Mr. Uible replied on May 28 to
Nifantiev that he was shocked that Dr. Oganov had evicted Media Sphera employees without notice, disconnected the phone lines, and shut off all the electricity; Dr. Bashinsky "was
physically threatened by two Mafia-type men who entered our office premises and suggested
that he resign;" the employees were threatened into quitting and joining the new company;
and, finally, Nifantiev cancelled the publishing contracts without any due cause and gave
them to the new company. 47 In fact, on Monday, May 27, the new managers were already
doing business as usual under the new ownership of the five editorial boards often to fifteen
48
physicians each, with the name changed only slightly to Media Sphera Publishing Group.
Uible immediately began to challenge the takeover as illegal. He enlisted help from the
U.S. Embassy, politicians, and lawyers, and even attempted in vain to get the MOH to agree
to arbitration of the dispute. The laws governing conduct of Uible's publishing business,
however, were not like those in America. Russian businesses had no fear of a lawsuit for
breach of contract. It will be recalled that Media Sphera rented space for the editorial staff.
In fact, the space was simply made available in the Institute of Preventive Medicine of the
MOH. Media Sphera paid monthly rent, not to the MOH or any other owner of the
building, but to the director of the Institute as an individual. Media Sphera did not sign a
lease with anyone. The renting of space was informally arranged with this individual and,
as Mr. Uible says, the rent was going up month by month. In the booming Moscow business
climate of the mid-i 990s, space was at a premium and was sometimes available only when
the person in control of a building found a way to squeeze more people in. There was no
way to enforce informal arrangements to occupy space that was made available only by the
grace of the rightful occupant.
Another unusual aspect of Mr. Uible's business was the informal arrangement to pay
employees. In the United States, members of editorial boards of scholarly journals serve
without pay, although the prestige can enhance their careers. Since the Russian physicians
on Mr. Uible's board received wholly inadequate salaries from the MOH, however, Mr.
Uible supplemented them from Media Sphera profits. He gave the chief editors of each
board $1,200 cash each month, to be divided among members as they saw fit. In addition,
he paid the chief editor a 20 percent commission for each advertisement he brought to the
journal. Unfortunately, these payments revealed the gross revenue of Media Sphera. The
chief editors calculated that the journals were very profitable and, in fact, Uible repatriated
$20,000 to $30,000 to the United States after many of his monthly visits.
Uible was courting disaster. He had intended from the beginning to build up the business
so that it could be sold to a Western publisher, but there was never a legal entity to be sold.
45. E-mail from Chief Editors to O.E. Nifantiev (May 20, 1996) (on file with author in Uible Papers, supra
note 37).
46. E-mail from Savali E. Bashinski to David Uible (May 24, 1996) (on file with author in Uible Papers,
sitpra note 37).
47. E-mail from David Uible to O.E. Nifantiev (May 28, 1996) (on file with author in Uible Papers, supra
note 37).
48. Interview with David Uible (Feb. 9, 1999).
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An agreement such as Uible's was not often enforced because of court expense and the
unpredictable reception in court for foreigners. Furthermore, Uible made the mistake of
being an absentee owner. Bashinsky ran the business in Moscow, keeping the American
owner advised by e-mail at his New Richmond, Ohio, home. Uible made monthly visits to
Moscow and carried home cash, not realizing that Russians tend not to understand absentee
ownership. The fact that Uible was not heavily involved in the business but reaped the
lion's share of profits was surely abhorrent to his Russian associates.
In May 1996 the door was open for a takeover, Russian style, which was accomplished
by locking out the owner. Mr. Uible reacted indignantly as would any American investor.
After all, he had a licensing agreement signed by a MOH official with power to sign, and
now that official was disavowing his own signature. The physician-editors and MOH officials had taken away his business and left him with a shell of a company with no publications to sell. For two years he conducted a vigorous campaign to recover the business or
legal damages. Finally, he realized no one could help him and that most of the officials he
had dealt with in the MOH and U.S. Embassy had moved on to other postings. His battle
to regain control illustrates the differences between the American and Russian legal systems.
He hired McKenna & Co., a U.K. law firm with offices in Moscow that immediately called
the MOH's attention to violations of Russian law perpetrated in the takeover. Its letter to
the MOH lists violations of law for which, ultimately, no practical remedy existed in Russia
at that time. The letter reads as follows:
Mr. Vilken
Deputy Minister
Ministry of Health
of the Russian Federation
MOW/DO395/44214.1
28 January 1997
Dear Mr. Vilken,
Thank you very much for your letter No. 2510/207-97-26 of 13 January 1997.
We would like to draw your attention to the fact that although there is no business relations
between the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation and AOZT "Media Sphera" the
Ministry of Health is, however, liable for the breach of its contractual obligations under the
contracts for publishing journals "Stomatologiya," "Russian Bulletin of Perinatology and Paediatrics," "Journal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry in the name of S. S. Korsakov," "Bulletin
of Dermathology and Venereal Diseases" and for its unlawful actions in relation to AOZT
"Media Sphera" as a co-founder of the journal "Cardiology." The Ministry is, therefore, a
defendant in relation to AOZT "Media Sphera" in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil
Code, Article 7 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Foreign Investments," the provisions
of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Mass Media" and the provisions of the Law of the
Russian Federation "On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Commodities' Markets."
The statement of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation that it was not in possession
of any information relating to the conflict between the Ministry and AOZT "Media Sphera"
does not correspond to the facts. On 28 May 1996 Mr. David Uible, the Chairman of the
Board of AOZT "Media Sphera" wrote a letter to Mr. Nifantiev, Head, Research Department
of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation in which he expressed his protest against
the illegal actions of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, there was
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a meeting between Mr. Nikolai Drozdov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations
and Russian Ombudsman for Commercial Relations with the United States, and Jan Kalicki,
Counselor to the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Ombudsman for Commercial Cooperation with the Russian Federation, which took place in Moscow on 22 October, 1996 and
at which, amongst other matters, the conflict between the Ministry of Health and AOZT
"Media Sphera" was discussed. Finally, at the same time there was a meeting in Moscow
between a representative of the Ministry of Health and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S.
Embassy Michael Copps where, amongst other matters, the conflict between the Ministry of
Health and AOZT "Media Sphera" was considered.
The statement of the Ministry that the letter of 5 July 1996 was not received at the address of
the Ministry also does not correspond to the facts. The letter of 5July 1996 and its copy were
received by Gulova, an officer of the Ministry on 5July 1996 which is supported by the attached
copy of the receipt.
Taking the above into consideration we ask you to consider the question of concluding arbitration agreements with AOZT "Media Sphera" once again.
We await your timely response.
Yours sincerely,
Leonid Zubarev
McKenna & Co. International
Mr. Zubarev tried to get MOH to sign an agreement to arbitrate in the International
Commercial Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian
Federation. He described that forum as having the same status as the London Court of
49
International Arbitration or any other international arbitration forum. He observed that
there was no agreement to arbitrate in the original agreements, however, and that arbitra50
tion could therefore only be with the consent of the MOH. He stated, "Presumably, the
MOH does not want to litigate at all, so I do not see any reason why they should agree in
writing to litigate in the International Commercial Arbitration Court."'i Uible could lodge
a claim in the state Arbitrazh court that would require up-front payment of state duties to
the court and "it is practically impossible to foresee as to how long it may take to sue in
Arbitrazh Courts."52 The duties Uible would have had to pay to lodge a claim at that time
were approximately $3,320 if the amount in controversy were $200,000. The cost of arbi3
tration would have been even higher.1
Difficulties finding a forum were not the only problem. Uible's case itself appeared weak,
as explained in the following excerpts from letters of Zubarev to Uible:
It appears that no publication agreement was ever agreed for "Cardiology", although
"Cardiology" was published by "Cardiosphera" and then, at the beginning of 1994, by
"Media Sphera."

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Letter from
Letter from
Letter from
Id.
Letter from

Leonid Zubarev to David H. Uible (Nov. 25, 1999).
Leonid Zubarev to David H. Uible (Nov. 22, 1999).
Leonid Zubarev to David H. Uible (Nov. 27, 1999).
Leonid Zubarev to David H. Uible (Nov. 25, 1999).
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"Media Sphera" was supposed to abandon the premises which it occupied. There is no
evidence of a lease agreement for this premises and we understand that payments for rent
were made in hard currency in cash.
"Media Sphera" would need to prove that it suffered damage as a result of the Ministry's
termination of the publishing contracts. Proving loss would be complicated by the fact
that "Media Sphera" had effectively ceased business when termination occurred. The
termination letter was dated 24 May 1996, by which time "Media Sphera" had been
evicted from its premises and it seems the majority of staff had left. Unless "Media Sphera"
had an enforceable lease agreement for its occupation of the premises (and we have seen
no evidence of this), "Media Sphera's" eviction was not unlawful and "Media Sphera" has
no claim in respect of this eviction.
The decision of the editorial board to change to another publishing company is not unlawful. No agreement was concluded between the editorial board and "Media Sphera" as
the publisher and the Law "On Mass-Media" imposes no obligation on the editorial board
to restrict is [sic] collaboration to one publishing house.
"Media Sphera" could apply to the Moscow Department of the State Anti-Monopoly
Committee of the Russian Federation on the basis of the breach of the anti-monopoly
legislation. Documentary evidence of the breach would need to be included in the application. If, however, the application is successful, the Anti-Monopoly Committee would
only order the editorial board to change the name of their company. It would not award
you monetary compensation.
The Law "On Mass-Media" requires every periodical publication to contain the names
of its founders. Since "Media Sphera" is a joint founder of "Cardiology", that fact should
appear in the magazine itself. At present the Ministry is named as the sole founder. The
founder [MOH] has the right to compel the editorial board to publish a message or
material in its name free of charge and for a specified period of time. The maximum extent
of the material which the founder can require to be published should be identified in the
charter of the editorial board or in the agreement between the editorial board and the
publisher. As far as we are aware, neither the charter nor the agreement exists, [emphasis
added]. Nevertheless, "Media Sphera" could require the Ministry to include its name into
4
"Cardiology" as a co-founder1
Can the Head of Research, Nifantiev, within the MOH, have authority to cancel publishing agreements?
Generally speaking the Minister of Health or his Deputy may sign contracts and terminate
them. Other officials may act on the grounds of resolutions adopted by the Minister or
on the grounds of a Power of Attorney issued by the Ministry. As to Nifantiev, I think it
would be difficult to prove that the termination itself was invalid. The Civil Code of the
Russian Federation provides that a transaction committed without authority is invalid
unless consequently approved by the person in whose name the transaction has been
entered into. Hence, even if Nifantiev was not entitled to terminate the publishing con54. Letter from Leonid Zubarev to David Uible Cune 24, 1999).
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tracts his actions are not automatically invalid. I think the Ministry will approve his actions
and make the termination valid from the date of the letter.5

The points sound similar to points that could be made under English or American commercial law. Indeed, Russia strives to enact commercial laws that reflect Western norms.
Litigation was not an option for most entrepreneurs, however, in part because the courts

required deposit of the amount in controversy before litigation could begin.
V. Sweetbaum and Uible Compared
What conclusions can be drawn from this history? It is clear that many problems of
American entrepreneurs resulted from enthusiasm untempered by understanding of the
Russian legal system. Too many Americans believed Russia's new capitalism was governed
by familiar rules similar to those in the West. Indeed, some laws being adopted indicated
that Russia would imitate the Western system, particularly the civil law system of Europe.
Vouchers had been converted to shares of stock, a stock market had emerged, and the law
protected shareholder rights. But shareholder rights were secured only in theory. In reality,

Russian entrepreneurs and former managers resented foreign ownership of the newly privatized businesses. As illustrated in the cases of entrepreneurs Sweetbaum and Uible, Russian shareholders simply refused to recognize foreign shareholders' rights. Sweetbaum, with
a combination of bravado and legal advice, was able to obtain control of his companies by
achieving 100 percent ownership and carefully observing Russian law. In contrast, many
Russians felt they could not succeed while they observed the law, and thus, they put lawabiding Americans at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, American law firms set up offices
in Moscow staffed by American lawyers and young Russian attorneys. American entrepreneurs often relied on them, but possibly they would have fared better with the advice of
seasoned Russian lawyers who knew the bureaucracy as well as the emerging black letter
law. Few relied solely on Russian counsel, as did Sweetbaum.
Uible believed he could place trusted lieutenants in charge of his business and reap the
rewards of his investment. He was an absentee owner much of the time, and was unseated
by the equivalent of a palace revolution. Although he owned the overwhelming majority of
the shares in his company, minority owners saw that the company was making good profits
that were going to Uible. In contrast, Sweetbaum eventually gained complete control of
his companies so that he could keep their profitability confidential.
VI. Conclusion
The enthusiasm of Americans for investment in Russia came to an abrupt end in August
1998 when the Russian banking system collapsed. There had already been much bad publicity in the American press, however, about American investments that Russians had simply
appropriated for themselves. There is some hope that a post-Yeltsin government will reform
the tax system and enforce property rights already enacted into law. The rush to the Russian
frontier of capitalism that developed in the 1990s is over, however. A golden opportunity
to develop a strong trading partnership with Russia was lost, and now, as before the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the only significant trade with Russia is in return for its raw materials.
Young people who admire the scope of Western business enterprise are the hope of Russia.
Most of their elders are hopelessly mired in the past.
55. Letter from Leonid Zubarev to David Uible (June 25, 1999).
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